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Abstract 
 
In this chapter, we argue that an institutional approach to feminist development economics provides 
deeper understandings to how gender inequalities function in economic processes in developing 
countries. We do this in three ways. First, we distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric gender 
institutions. Second, we distinguish gendered institutions between formal (laws and regulations) and 
informal ones (social norms and cultural practices). Third, we develop an empowerment model in 
which both resources and gendered institutions affect women’s wellbeing achievements, allowing for 
situations in which the positive effect of women’s access to resources is overruled by the negative 
effect of gendered laws or social norms. We illustrate our argument with a case study on the 
livelihoods of Yoruba women in Nigeria. The case study shows how gender norms result in an 
asymmetric institutional setting for women and men, even when norms about women’s labor force 
participation, individual control over income, and partners’ contribution to the household budget are 
symmetric. The combination of our theoretical contribution and our case study findings and test of the 
empowerment model in previous research have an important implication for a particular approach in 
feminist development economics, namely the household bargaining approach. This approach is widely 
used as an explanatory framework for women’s disadvantaged economic position in developing 
countries. We elaborate this approach with an institutional perspective and show how this helps to 
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explain the economic position of women who find themselves in the paradoxical situation of strong 
economic independence in a highly unequal legal, social, and cultural context. 
 
Introduction: the interrelatedness of gender inequality and economics  
Gender in economics is no longer analysed exclusively in terms of gender inequalities in economic 
variables, such as employment or wages and as the differential impacts of economic processes and 
policies on men and women. Gender is also understood as, first, shaping market processes in terms of 
access to and control over resources, such as education or incomes, second, as shaping people’s 
choices, for example in segmented labour markets, and third, as being inherently part of 
macroeconomic trends, for example through fluctuations in the female labour force participation rate 
or in responses to crises though increases in the supply of unpaid labour. So, gender is increasingly 
understood not only as an exogenous variable (coming from outside the economic system, from 
culture, social relations, nature, or laws), but also as endogenous – shaping and being shaped by 
particular economic processes, conditions, and outcomes.  
We propose an institutional economic approach to analyse gender in economics, in particular in 
development economics. The reason is that such an approach allows for a better understanding of the 
two-way relationship between gender and economics. We will argue that gendered institutions are the 
key to understand how the economy affects gender relations and how gender relations affect 
economic processes and outcomes. Before we will develop our theoretical framework of gendered 
institutions we will explain what institutions are in economics and how gender has been understood in 
institutional economics. We are aware that what we refer to as institutions, is recognized as social 
norms or culture in other domains of the social sciences. Economics uses the term institutions, to 
indicate that social norms and culture influence economic decisions, and that economic behaviour 
helps shaping social norms and cultural patterns. We will explain this in more detail in the next 
section. 
 
Gender Norms as Institutions 
Whereas a century ago, the founding father of institutional economics, Thorstein Veblen, recognized 
gender norms as exemplary for how historical and cultural patterns influence the economic process of 
provisioning, today, institutional economics seems to be less concerned with gendered institutions. 
Certainly, today, gender norms are recognized as influential institutions, but Veblen’s deep concern 
with patriarchal institutions does not play a key role in institutional analysis anymore. Explicit 
concerns with gender norms seem to have become one specialized area among others. This was not so 
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for Veblen, who did not merely analyze the role of patriarchal norms out of an exclusive interest in 
women’s disadvantaged position,1 but rather studied these norms in order to understand how power 
and ideology affect the economy. As Jennings (1993, 113) has argued when referring to Veblen 
(1964): “Veblen’s views of the ‘Barbarian status of women’ were linked to a larger opposition to 
social hierarchy rooted in invidious distinctions.” This integrated attention to gender norms has led 
Veblen to various important insights, for example, on the role of the household in late nineteenth 
century United States, with middle class women expressing men’s status through their (supposed) 
leisure. In The Theory of the Leisure Class, he notes that: 
. . . the position of woman in any community is the most striking index of the level of culture 
attained by the community, and it might be added, by any given class in the community. This 
remark is perhaps truer as regards the stage of economic development than as regards 
development in any other respect. At the same time the position assigned to the woman in the 
accepted scheme of life, in any community or under any culture, is in a very great degree an 
expression of traditions which have been shaped by the circumstances of an earlier phase of 
development, and which have been but partially adapted to the existing economic 
circumstances, or to the existing exigencies of temperament and habits of mind by which the 
women living under this modern economic situation are actuated. (Veblen 1931, 353) 
 
Today, institutional economists who are concerned about gender norms plea for a more systematic, 
Veblenian, attention to gender in institutional economics. The reasons for such a plea partly emerge 
from insights provided by feminist economics. Jennings (1993), for example, has argued that 
institutionalism could build on the feminist critique of Western Cartesian dualisms such as 
public/private, economy/family, mind/body, rational/emotional, and competitive/nurturant. She has 
shown that these categories are not neutral but imbued with symbolic gender meanings, referring to 
stereotypical characterizations of femininity and masculinity. The genderedness of dualisms 
underlying much of mainstream economic thought of rationality, households, and the division of 
labor, is key to the understanding of the various levels at which institutions operate, she argues. At the 
same time, however, we should be aware about their cultural specificity and not assume that they are 
the same across cultures, as this paper will illustrate. In particular, as Harding (1986, 167-79) has 
claimed, African worldviews do not neatly fit the portrayal of Cartesian dualisms. We should be very 
careful with universalizing categories such as “the African woman” (Olson 1994, 88-89) or polygamy 
(Hale 1995), as they conceal intersections with class and ethnicity as well as other social 
differentiations. From such cultural awareness, Mayhew (1999) has emphasized the shared 
understanding in feminist and institutional economics of the cultural specific and social construction 
of economic reality. She notes that in both schools of thought power is recognized as a central force in 
the economy and that therefore the power of gender norms would make a logical part of institutional 
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analysis. Dugger (1996) has brought the various power relations together in the recognition of “four 
modes of inequality” (race, gender, class and nation) each of which is supported by institutional 
arrangements making use of myths. In yet another contribution on similarities between institutional 
and feminist economics, Whalen and Whalen (1994) conclude that both approaches represent a 
holistic ontology, a pragmatic epistemology, and a comprehensive view of values. Finally, Waller and 
Jennings (1990) warn us that institutionalists may run the risk of slipping back into the Cartesian 
dualisms dominating mainstream economics. They alert us to the influence of culture on our 
knowledge creation, which may blind our view on certain issues, such as gender. Therefore, they 
advise us to “. . .  look at the cultural process of inquiry as outsiders to better see the prejudices 
embedded within it, and employ a method similar to the one that  Veblen applied to his inquiry into 
modern industrial economies” (Waller and Jennings 1990, 618). 
 We follow Dugger (1996), as well as many others, who have characterized patriarchy as a 
system of gender inequality (Odebode and van Staveren, 2007). This system is supported by 
institutions that are gendered, and therefore working out asymmetrically for men and women. They 
have different effects on men as compared to women, and generally, they benefit men more than 
women. As noted by Martin (2004), contemporary uses of social institutions highlight practices, 
conflict, identity, power and change. Treating gender as an institution increases awareness of gender’s 
profound sociality and makes its invisible dynamics and complex intersections with other institutions 
more apparent and subject to critical analysis and change. As explained in the Social Institutions and 
Gender Index (2012), the concept of social institutions has been adopted by several disciplines to 
draw attention to the role of ‘culture’ or social relations in limiting or enabling individual or collective 
agency. North (1990) described institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights).” The ‘social’ aspect of social institutions refers to the way in which formal laws, informal 
laws, social norms and practices influence social relations or human interactions. As explained further 
under the Index, discriminatory social institutions are those that restrict or exclude women and girls 
and consequently curtail their access to opportunities, resources and power which negatively impacts 
upon development outcomes. Through their influence on the unequal distribution of power between 
men and women in the private sphere of the family, in the economic sphere, and in public life, 
discriminatory (what we call asymmetric) social institutions constrain the opportunities of men and 
women and their capabilities to live the life they value. 
The next section elaborates the notion of asymmetric institutions. The following section links gender 
norms to the household, acknowledging that within households, gender norms interact with other 
social norms, in particular norms about culture, ethnicity and class.  
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Symmetric and Asymmetric Institutions 
Not all institutions are asymmetric, of course – if they were, there would be no need to distinguish 
them from symmetric institutions. Many institutions are symmetric i.e., having similar effects on 
different social groups. Examples are universal primary education, exchange rates, or language 
(although even these may be affected to some extent by social differentiations). Hence, the distinction 
between symmetric and asymmetric institutions requires clarification. The sociological account of 
institutions by Martin (2004) may be helpful, since she has provided a detailed characterization of 
institutions, combining a wide variety of views in sociology from Parsons to Giddens. One of the 
strengths of sociological thinking about institutions is the recognition of asymmetries at the level of 
structures, identity, and symbolic meanings. Martin (2004, 1256-8) discusses five features of 
institutions that refer to asymmetries that are relevant for institutional feminist economics. These are 
features of institutions that: 
 both constrain and facilitate behavior by group members 
 are characterized by particular expectations, rules, and procedures 
 are internalized by group members as identities 
 have a legitimating ideology, and 
 are organized in accord with and permeated by power. 
 
Below, we briefly discuss these features, with reference to gender norms, elaborating Martin’s own 
connections of each of these with gender.  
“Constrain and facilitate behavior by group members.” 
Gender-based constraints and facilitations are created by what  Folbre (1994)  referred to as gendered 
structures of constraint. Such structures constrain as well as define people’s behavior in the following 
sense: “Citizens can do X, non-citizens cannot. Men can do Y, women cannot” (Folbre 1994, 40). But 
gender norms are also challenged, evaded, bended, and negotiated by women, leading to a process of 
institutional change. Indeed, as she explains, “groups organized along lines of gender and age make 
particularly conspicuous efforts to reinforce the institutional arrangements that they find 
advantageous, and to change those they find burdensome” (Folbre 1994, 1). 
 
“Characterized by particular expectations, rules, and procedures.” 
Men and women partly engage in different social practices, such as those related to the gender 
division of labor, as Jennings (1993) has pointed out. Expectations about gender roles are expressed 
very early in a child’s socialization, and shape a child’s development into typically masculine and 
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feminine roles. The expectations and roles will subsequently shape the choices men and women make 
in their lives. For example, in the labor market, in which job segregation is maintained through a 
complex institutional setting of entry barriers, images, and valuations of stereotypically but invisibly 
labeled masculine and feminine jobs (Elson 1999). 
 
“Internalized by group members as identities.”  
Based on her empirical work on the economic position of women in South Asia,  Agarwal has 
recognized that gender norms “are revealed not only in the division of labor and resources between 
women and men, but also in ideas and representations – ascribing to women and men of different 
abilities, attitudes, desires, personality traits, behavior patterns, and so on” (1997, 1). This suggests 
that gender norms are able to affect an agent’s identity, which is precisely what  Hodgson has 
identified as being part and parcel of the old, Veblenian institutional economics: “Different 
institutions can act as more than constraints on behavior: they may actually change the character and 
beliefs of the individual” (Hodgson 2004, 257). In the case of the symbolic meanings of gender 
attached to men and women, attention to gendered identities implies “a recognition that ‘maleness’ 
and ‘femaleness’ matter for the way in which decisions are made and resources allocated” (Katz 1997, 
26).  
 
“Legitimating ideology.”  
Gender norms are legitimized through shared beliefs as well as through male interest protecting these 
norms. This, in turn, may prevent the development and implementation of more efficient solutions to 
coordination problems, when these require a breaking-up of gender norms, as Veblen had noted 
sharply, when he recognized that patriarchal norms often lead to inefficiencies.  Hodgson (1984) has 
provided a good example of this in the area of human resource management. He refers to an instance 
in which male supervisors took away women workers’ control over their work speed, believing that 
such control would provide them with too much freedom. The result of this was a reduction in labor 
productivity.  
“Organized in accord with and permeated by power.” 
Waller and Jennings point at the role of power in institutions and acknowledge that attention to power 
always had a central place in institutional thought. “Institutionalists have always dealt with the use of 
power through multifaceted systems of status and hierarchy” (Waller and Jennings 1990, 620). Status 
and hierarchy allow that men, as Goetz notes, “tend to act, across divisions like class or race, more 
cohesively than women do in defense of certain gender interests, and they do so in ways which mean 
that public institutions help to forge connections between men’s public and private power” (Goetz 
1997, 17). At the same time, it is important to recognize that gender is not a unified, homogeneous 
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institution because the power relations implied are continuously played out, openly or in a hidden 
manner. Drawing on the work by Commons, Mayhew, for example states that “economic organization 
has been understood as the consequence of conflicting interests among groups who make use of 
power and of the accepted processes of adjudication in the society in question” (Mayhew 1999, 484).  
Harriss-White (2000, 236) therefore recognizes that the market, as an institution, “has the capacity to 
be a site of ethnic and/or gender subordination as well as of liberation.” 
 
In conclusion, the five asymmetric features of institutions recognized by Martin enable us to 
characterize gender as a complex, multi-dimensional institution shaped unequally for men and 
women, with men generally benefiting more than women in terms of access to and control over 
resources, the household division of labor, the distribution of rewards, and decision-making power. 
Such an understanding of gender as an asymmetric institution promises a richer understanding of 
gender norms than economic approaches to gender analysis where gender tends to be seen as either an 
individual behavioral constraint (as in the new institutional economics), as stemming from individual 
preferences (as in the new home economics), or as part of the fall-back position (as in household 
bargaining theory). This leads us to refine the commonly used symmetric definition of institutions in 
economics into one that more explicitly acknowledges that institutions may not be neutral social 
rules/norms influencing behavior similarly across groups. Drawing on Hodgson (2004, 424), we 
would like to characterize institutions as durable systems of established and embedded social rules 
that structure social interactions in society either similarly, differently, or unequally for different 
groups in society. When the effect is different or unequal for different groups, we speak of 
asymmetric institutions. 
 
An institutional approach to feminist development economics 
Recent research into women’s empowerment shows a shift in emphasis from the individualistic 
approach towards the social level, pointing out that the institutional context of gender norms, 
gendered cultural practices and gendered beliefs have a strong impact on women’s bargaining power, 
decision making, and wellbeing outcomes. This influence can be pictured in figure 1 (see also van 
Staveren, 2009). Cell A corresponds to the individualistic approach to the analysis and policy making 
on the resources-empowerment nexus. It concerns the constraints that formal gendered institutions, 
such as unequal property rights, asymmetric inheritance laws, or inequalities in school systems and 
labor markets, may have on women’s access to resources (and to a much less extent on their control 
over resources). But when they have access, the individualistic assumptions become dominant and it 
is expected that women will just turn these resources into empowerment. 
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Figure 1: Women’s empowerment, resources and gendered institutions 
Formal gendered 
institutions 
Informal gendered 
institutions 
Resources & empowerment 
A. e.g. unequal 
property rights, 
asymmetric 
inheritance laws, 
inequalities in school 
systems and labor 
markets 
B. e.g. labor market 
segregation, gender 
biases in credit markets 
Access to resources 
 
C. e.g. legal male 
approval for 
women’s buying and 
sales of property  
D. e.g. patriarchal 
norms supporting male 
control over household 
resources as head of 
household 
(Access to but limited) Control over 
resources 
 
E. laws that allow for 
early marriage hence 
average high age 
difference at 
marriage 
F. gender division of 
labor, social norms 
about proper behavior 
for women and men 
(access to and or control over 
resources) Transforming resources into 
achievements – not automatic but needs 
to be activated through agency  
Source: developed by the authors. 
 
The other cells (B-F), however, tend to receive much less attention in research and policy making, but 
are equally important for women’s empowerment and the spin-off effects quoted above. These are 
precisely the dimensions that bring in the social perspective. Cell B refers to the informal gendered 
institutions that limit women’s access to resources, such as labor market segregation and gender 
biases in credit markets. Cells C and D bring into the picture what happens when women have access 
to resources but limited control: both formal and informal institutions tend to affect control over 
resources, such as property rights and patriarchal norms that support male control over household 
resources. Finally, cells E and F indicate that even when women have control over resources, formal 
and informal gendered institutions will still exert their influence, by constraining women’s agency. 
Resources do not automatically translate into empowerment, but need to be put to work through 
agency. This agency, however, may be constrained by formal institutions (cell E), such as laws that 
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allow for early marriage, leading to an average high age difference at marriage, which in turn will not 
support women’s household bargaining power (in Ethiopia, for example, there is an average marital 
age difference of 7 years, according to the 2005 DHS data). Even more likely is that women’s agency 
is affected by informal gendered institutions (cell F), with the gender division of labor, widespread 
practices of wife beating, and social norms about what is proper behavior for a woman, which will all 
limit the use that women can make and do make of the resources that they have, whether it be 
education, income, assets, land or credit. 
In some recent studies women’s earnings have no impact on bargaining power at all while an 
institutional variable such as a lower gender wage gap does significantly lower women’s unpaid 
work-load (MacPhail and Dong, 2007) and reduces domestic violence (Anna Aizer, 2007). Also other 
extra-household variables appear to affect bargaining power. For example, more gender-aware 
divorce laws have been shown to reduce married women’s suicide, domestic violence, and the number 
of women murdered by their partners (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006). There is, however, a more 
disturbing trend in the literature which indicates that women’s individual earnings, education, 
awareness of their rights, or formal ownership of assets has no impact at all or sometimes even a 
negative impact on their decision making power and wellbeing in households. For some women, 
credit makes them worse off in terms of net income (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996), it increases 
domestic violence (Rahman, 1999), or it raises their hours of wage labor at very unfavorable 
conditions and at cost of their own businesses (Garikipati, 2008). Other research, mainly from sub-
Saharan Africa, has indicated that the higher women’s income, the lower men’s contribution to 
household expenditures and the higher the share of income that men spend on personal consumption 
(Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Odebode and van Staveren, 2007). 
Bina Agarwal (1997) already suggested that gendered social norms form a kind of pre-
condition for household bargaining power, whereas she also referred to them as extra-household 
power. We suggest that the gendered social norms, beliefs, and practices, which shape gendered 
institutions, are both a pre-condition of individual and household level bargaining and at the same 
time a source of extra-household bargaining power for the advantaged partner. Hence, gendered 
institutions are a kind of ‘windfall bargaining power’ because that power is outside the control of both 
partners but provides the one with a clear advantage over the other. As such, gendered institutions 
may neutralize women’s bargaining power from individual resources, by affecting their exit options 
(Heath and Ciscel, 1996), their bargaining agency, for example accepting male authority when they 
have formally equal rights (Blumberg, 1991a; Nikièma, Haddad and Potvin, 2008), their preferences, 
through adapting these to what is deemed proper for women (Sen, 1990), and their roles in the 
household, limiting what can and what cannot be bargained over, (see for example Cuesta, 2006, on 
machismo as a household distribution rule in Chile). To bring some order in the complex process of 
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gender in the economy, we distinguish three levels of bargaining power. These three levels of 
bargaining power have decreasing levels of individual control or are simply given – see figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Extended household bargaining framework with examples of bargaining power 
 Individual bargaining 
power 
Household bargaining 
power 
Institutional 
bargaining power 
Objective/formal Income, assets, age, 
education 
Age difference, 
educational difference, 
wealth 
Gender unequal laws and 
regulations 
Subjective/informal Awareness of rights, 
attitude towards violence 
against women 
Difference in attitude 
towards violence against 
women 
Gender unequal social 
norms, cultural beliefs, 
and traditional practices 
Source: developed by authors. 
 
An institutional understanding of gender in development economics results in the following economic 
model for women’s empowerment. In Figure 3 below, women’s achievements are measured as gender 
gaps in achievements in health, education and decision making power. This means, female-male 
differences. Resources are defined in terms of access to education, credit and jobs. Each of the two 
categories of institutions, formal and informal, can be measured using data from the OECD-GID 
(Gender, Institutions and Development) online database. These include, among others, data on the 
existence of laws on violence against women; the prevalence of female genital mutilation; the 
prevalence of child marriage; hindrances for women to get bank loans; and hindrances for women to 
land rights. 
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Figure 3: Women’s Empowerment Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         Factors influencing women’s decisions or actions 
                                
An empirical analysis testing this model for hundred developing countries (van Staveren, 2013) has 
indicated that women’s access to resources does, as was expected, have a positive effect on their 
achievements. But the analysis has also pointed out that strong gendered institutions overrule this 
effect. Gendered institutions put a serious constraint on women’s agency, which prevents them from 
turning their resources into wellbeing achievements. Hence, women’s access to resources is important 
but not sufficient for women’s empowerment. It is therefore crucial for feminist development 
economics to get a better understanding of gendered institutions. 
 
Gender Norms and Intersections with Culture, Ethnicity and Class 
Norms often interact with each other and therefore institutions are often found to be related. For such 
interactions between institutions in the economy, Harriss-White (2000, 237) has argued that 
“exchange processes are constituted by, and constitute in turn, a wide set of social institutions: state, 
locality, class, ethnic group, caste, religion, kin, age and gender.” So, whereas gender norms in 
Women’s achievements 
- health 
- literacy 
- political decision making 
Women’s access to 
resources 
- education 
- credit 
- jobs 
Gendered formal 
institutions:  
laws & rights on: 
- inheritance 
- property 
- violence against 
women 
 
 
Gendered informal 
institutions: 
social norms and cultural 
practices on: 
- child marriage 
- female genital 
mutilation 
         Women’s agency 
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general may be regarded as an asymmetric institution, the specific expression of such norms will often 
be mediated through other institutions, resulting in a complex, layered set of institutions, such as the 
labor market, the firm, property rights, the tax system, or public services. Such institutions then 
become “bearers of gender,” as Elson (1999) has noted. 
One particular institution that deserves attention as a bearer of gender is the household. Veblen 
already noted its embeddedness in patriarchy: “The ‘home’ is the household with a male head” 
(Veblen [1899] 1931, 355). This is still valid today, as Goetz has noted, because the family and the 
household are still “the primary institution[s] in which women’s entitlements and capabilities are so 
distorted as to undermine their capacity to manage transactions to their advantage in other 
institutions” (Goetz 1997, 5). The household, hence, is very often a gendered institution, while at the 
same time it mediates other institutions, such as class, race, and ethnicity (Peterson 1994; Olson 1994; 
Andersen and  Collins 1997; Marchand and Parpart 1995; Harriss-White 2000). However, households 
are not by definition gendered, and hence asymmetrical. Feminist ideals of a society with gender 
equality include visions of households that represent equal respect for all its members. Such visions of 
post-patriarchal households include ideals of single-sex households, one-person households, and 
households consisting of men and women who may take up partially different roles, but this would not 
result in unequal positions for them.  
In developing countries, the household is a rather fluid concept due to the wide variety of types of 
households (extended households, in- and out-migration in households, multiple households in 
polygamous marriages) and complex differences between the concepts of “household” and “family” 
(Guyer 1981). Whereas for Wallerstein and  Smith (1991) the commonality between different 
households is perceived to be basically economic, namely a common pool of income, researchers 
familiar with sub-Saharan Africa reject the idea that income pooling between husband and wife and/or 
other members of the household would be a necessary requirement for an institution to be identified 
as a household (Fapohunda 1988; Blumberg 1991a; Clark 1994). Households, hence, mediate gender, 
but also mediate social differences such as class (Harriss-White 2000). In an African context – in 
which our case study is situated – the notion of class goes beyond typical Western categories such as 
capitalist/worker, or white collar/blue collar worker but often involves people’s self-identification 
(Jackman 1994). In developing countries class boundaries are better expressed along the lines of the 
formal/informal economy, that is, the status of economic activities and the level of security they give, 
acknowledging that the boundary between the two is not very clear.  
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Example: Poor Yoruba Women in Ibadan, Nigeria 
Our case study derives from a larger study on the livelihoods of urban Yoruba women in the city of 
Ibadan, Nigeria (Odebode 2004). The study entails a survey, carried out in 2001, among 191 Yoruba 
women in the city, and interviews, done in 2002, with 31 women (taken from the survey sample). The 
Yoruba believe in strong, patrilineal kinship ties as a means of holding society together, which is 
apparent in the extended, patrilocal family system. 
Nigerian institutions are highly gendered ( Sa’ad 2001). Family institutions involve strict gender 
norms on marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance, which all appear to be very restrictive for 
women. Sa’ad states that married women become de facto the property of their husband, they do not 
inherit land or resources, divorce is strongly disapproved of and therefore rare, and child custody is 
given automatically to the father. About inheritance, he writes that “as properties of men rather than 
their equals, women are themselves inheritable items in many traditional rural communities in 
Nigeria” (Sa’ad 2001, 74). He noted that women have no individual property rights, their work on 
family farms is unpaid, and they have a very high burden of unpaid work in the household in which 
men do not share much. In a study on women’s household decision-making, Gammage (1997) has 
shown that there are significant gender differences between ethnic groups in Nigeria. Yoruba 
women’s decision-making power index, running from 0 to 1, was 0.73, compared to 0.83 for Ibo and 
0.89 for Hausa and Fulani women. A contradictory picture emerges for Yoruba women in Gammage’s 
survey: they are better educated and contribute more often to household expenditures compared to 
other ethnic groups, but at the same time their decision making power in the household is lower. Our 
case study provides some insights into this paradox by primary data analysis from a feminist 
institutional perspective. 
Out of the 191 women in our survey, 66% were Christian and 34% were Muslim and almost all 
women were married (or had been married – only two women were single). The level of education of 
the urban women appeared to be surprisingly high, confirming Gammage’s findings of high Yoruba 
girls’ school enrolment. Although many women combine a job in the formal and informal economy, 
the data indicate that the most important occupation is an informal one, namely trading. Together, the 
four informal occupations included in our data set (trader, hairdresser, tailor, and the diverse category) 
provided the main employment for 99 women, which is 51.8% (90 women had formal employment, 
making up 47.1%). The informal economy in Ibadan is characterized by relatively high-income 
insecurity, low average earnings, and high underemployment, while the formal economy in the city 
tends to have relative job and income stability, reasonable labor standards and some social protection. 
Finally, we have tried to collect data on women’s incomes, which proved to be very difficult. We 
collected income data in broad ranges in the interviews, which we present in Figure 4. Most women, 
13 (42%), were found in the very low income category, four (13%) in the low income category, five 
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(16%) in the medium income category, while a relatively large number, nine (29%) were found in the 
reasonable income category (this last category reflects more or less a middle class income in Ibadan, 
largely earned by people with a formal sector job – a minority of all Nigerian workers). The figure 
shows a rather uncommon income distribution, which is quite likely to be attributed to the low 
number of observations and the interview sample selection including relatively many women with 
jobs in the formal economy.  
 
Figure 4. Individual income levels % (n = 31) 
 
Source: own calculations. 
 
The picture that emerges from the data is mixed. On the one hand, the average level of education is 
quite high for women in Africa; on the other hand, the dependency rate in these women’s households 
is also high, with one third of the women living in households with 7 to 9 members, which 
substantially lowers per capita income. About half of the women earn an income in the informal 
economy, with trading as the most frequent primary and secondary occupation. The smaller sample, 
containing 31 women, gave some indication about earnings, suggesting that the majority of the 
women earn a very low, to low income. Finally, cross tabulation of employment with income level 
reveals that formal jobs tend to pay better than informal jobs. 
The next two sub-sections will analyze the major norms found in the case study operating in Yoruba 
households and their genderedness. These will be divided over two types: economic norms and family 
norms. 
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Economic Norms 
We found two economic norms operating in Yoruba households, both concerned with financial 
independence: 
 partners2 are each expected to earn an income and to contribute to household expenditures 
 partners keep direct control over their income by non-pooling3 
 
Interestingly, these two norms are quite different from the dominant Western economic norms of a 
male breadwinner and income pooling in households. Whereas Western patriarchy, as Veblen noted, 
turns women into dependants in the household, West African patriarchy rather tends to make women 
responsible for earning their own livelihood as well as most of their children’s and part of their 
husbands’. The two economic norms seem to be symmetric, in particular in comparison with the 
Western norms of the male breadwinner and income pooling.  
The first economic norm, about income earning and contributing to household expenditures, expresses 
the cultural importance that the Yoruba place on independence and individual responsibility in 
economic affairs. This was mentioned repeatedly in the interviews – the Yoruba strongly dislike 
financial dependence, men and women alike. One woman phrased it thus in the interviews:  
“A woman who has children – not one or two but many – and waits for the man to 
meet all her needs and the children’s without generating an income herself is ‘dead.’” 
 190 (99.5%) of the women earn an income and contribute to the household budget. We found  
different expenditure categories culturally assigned to men and women. Women contribute more than 
men to a variety of major and minor expenditure categories. In particular, women spent more than 
men on daily school needs (meals, stationary, transport), food and other household needs, children’s 
clothing, cooking fuel, drinking water, and social expenditures. Men, on the other hand, contributed 
more to rent, school fees, hospital bills, and electricity. The only category in which women and men 
spent more or less equally is medicine. We have estimated the average female contribution to 
household expenditures to be around 50% of total household expenditures. This reveals that the 
symmetric norm of contributing to household expenditures is quite well followed up in practice in 
Yoruba households. 
The second economic norm that we found, non-pooling of incomes in households, also appeared to 
have strong support from the women. But in this case, the reasons that the women gave to explain this 
norm and their adherence to it did not appeal to moral values of independence, equality, and 
responsibility but to the need to protect themselves against male rent-seeking behavior or even 
appropriation of their earnings and assets by men. Women made clear that they did not want to run the 
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risk that their husband would use their income to support his other wives and children or to use it as a 
resource for marrying another wife. 
“He does not even know about my savings and contributions because we are many wives and 
he is not helping me in taking care of the children.” 
“A sane and wise woman will never try to do joint savings account with a man because it is 
the day a man dies that you actually know the number of children he has.” 
 
Our data on the second economic norm reveal that the large majority of women (married and 
previously married), 85.7%, do/did not pool their income in the household and this also applies to 
savings as the overwhelming majority of women keep their savings separate: 86.2% (163 of 189 
women).  
The high share of earning, contribution, and non-pooling of income and savings among the women in 
our survey indicates that the economic norms are quite strong in Yoruba households. This situation, 
however, stands in stark contrast with the disadvantaged socio-economic position of Yoruba women 
as was indicated in the literature on women’s position in Nigeria referred to above. Part of the answer 
to this paradox should probably be sought in a different set of norms, which will be discussed below. 
 
Family Norms 
The main family norms that we found operating in Yoruba households are clearly asymmetric:  
 marriage norms in particular on property, inheritance, polygamy and child custody, which benefit 
men/fathers/sons over women/mothers/daughters 
 norms on the division of labor in which women are assigned most of the unpaid work 
 
The interviewees unanimously expressed a lack of inheritance rights and individual property for 
women – what they owned was owned by the household, headed by their husbands, except for their 
business assets in case of self-employed women in the informal economy. Property rights and 
inheritance are clearly unequal for the Yoruba, and are laid out in culturally embedded rules and 
procedures in favour of men. One of our respondents explained that:  
“Amongst the Yoruba, the male child is regarded as “Arole”’ which means “he who stays and 
fills the house.” And there is the saying that a female born of a woman is only a passenger 
whose final destination is her husband’s home so a woman is just for her father to care for 
before she gets married.” 
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On the norm of child custody, the interviews made clear that women had no custody rights upon 
separation or divorce. The few women who had separated or divorced had their children with them 
only when and as long as they were very young. The lack of child custody for women appeared to be 
an important reason behind the low divorce rate in our survey (6%). On polygamy, our data reveal 
that 48 (25.4%) women were in a polygamous marriage. However, we found that the border between 
monogamous and polygamous marriages appeared to be uncertain, because a monogamous marriage 
may become polygamous at any time. So, even though three quarters of marriages in our case study 
are monogamous, women’s marriage may change over time from one category to the other, 
sometimes without the first wife even knowing of her husband’s new marriage arrangements. Indeed, 
we found that out of the 189 married women, 20 (11%) experienced their husband taking another wife 
over the past six months. 
The second family norm that came up in the case study is about the division of unpaid work over 
household members. When asked whether they expect help from their husbands in the areas of 
childcare, cooking, cleaning, wood collection and repairs, 53% of the women said that they did not 
expect any help (except for some repair work). Husbands share between 0% and 29% in various 
household tasks (11% on average). Husbands’ help in cleaning is completely absent, and below 10% 
for cooking and water collection.  
“Some men help their wives while others do not. However, when visitors are around those 
who normally help will not. This is to avoid the wife being given bad names because it is 
generally believed she is controlling her husband – if not, he would not be doing female 
chores. For example, the mother-in-law will readily believe this.”  
In conclusion, the family norms clearly favor men, who can marry many wives, inherit property 
without needing to share with their sisters, have automatic child custody, and hardly share in domestic 
work and childcare. These asymmetric norms find support in a gendered ideology, socialization, rules 
and sanctions, keeping male-female power differences firmly in place. Together, these provide the 
institutional foundation for the highly gendered family norms of the Yoruba, glorifying masculine 
beliefs, rules, and practices, while denigrating what is regarded as feminine. At the same time, 
however, these norms are not entirely fixed over place and time: sometimes they are challenged. This 
was expressed, for example, by the eleven women in our sample (6%) who left their husbands, despite 
strong social disapproval. 
 
Interaction between Symmetric and Asymmetric Norms and Household Bargaining 
In this section, we come back to the paradox that we phrased earlier: how is it possible that the 
majority of Yoruba women have such low decision making power in the household whereas there are 
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such strong economic norms and practices of financial independence? We argue that symmetric and 
asymmetric norms should not be regarded as competing with each other. Instead, we argue that the 
two types of norms are interdependent. In our case study, the economic norms, expressing values of 
independence and shared responsibility, are influenced by the family norms operating simultaneously 
in the household, which express male advantage and masculine ideals and power. The seemingly 
symmetric norms of income earning and shared contribution to household expenditures as norms do 
indeed reflect values of autonomy and equality. But when implemented in an institutional context that 
is characterized by other norms that are asymmetric, having very unequal effects on men and women, 
the practical consequences of living up to the symmetric norms are no longer symmetric. We see that 
when we look at the practical implications of the asymmetric family norms for the ability of women in 
Yoruba households to act according to the symmetric economic norms. A Yoruba woman’s limited 
property rights and access to resources sets her at a disadvantage in income earning compared to men. 
These gendered constraints make women’s paid work less productive and also keeps their unpaid 
work at very low levels of productivity, while the combination of the two also constrains the 
opportunities for women to invest, to move to better earning activities, and to save. Moreover, male 
child custody rights provide a disincentive for women to leave their husbands, because, as it was 
expressed in the interviews, they did not want their children to suffer “at the hands of a step-mother.” 
Moreover, leaving the husband and taking their children with them requires a minimum level of 
income to pay themselves for the rent, as well as the emotional strength to put up with the criticism of 
the family-in-law and the disrespect shown by Yoruba people in general for separated women. So, the 
interaction between symmetric and asymmetric – gendered – norms in the household not only makes 
the institution of the household into a bearer of gender but also turns the effects of the symmetric 
norms into unequal outcomes. In our case study, we can trace this paradoxical process in four 
elements: 
- men’s stronger property rights and access to resources, as well as their lesser time spent on 
unpaid work and childcare give them a higher earning capacity than women. 
- masculine ideals of head of the household and sustaining the family lineage give a strong 
symbolic meaning to male status, even when women earn more than their husbands: 30%  of 
the women said that their husbands reduced their financial contributions to the household as 
soon as they were able to increase their contributions, while 48% of the women revealed that 
they regularly pay for traditional male expenditure categories, in particular children’s school 
fees. 
- fathers’ customary right to child custody in combination with patrilocality of the household 
provides a strong disincentive for women to “retaliate” against men’s reduced contributions 
with lower contributions as well or leaving the husband. 
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- non-pooling of income allows men to hide how much they earn, and hence, women’s claim 
on their income. 
These results have implications for the household bargaining approach. Whereas in the bargaining 
approach increased income, savings, and assets are regarded as improving women’s bargaining 
position, our case study has shown that this is not necessarily the case. Rather, they may crowd out 
men’s contribution without affecting men’s social status. So, what is generally regarded as bargaining 
power is better understood in a feminist institutional approach as male free riding on a symmetric 
economic norm, in a dominant asymmetric institutional context. Moreover, in the bargaining 
approach, two parties are assumed to bargain in order to further their respective interests, unless one’s 
fall-back position provides a better outcome. Our case study shows that the interests of a third party – 
the children – matter too. Whereas for men, having children is sufficient to confirm their masculinity, 
while the actual care for their children is left to the mother, or another wife, women are not only 
concerned with the social status of motherhood – which is considerable – but also with their 
children’s wellbeing and education in their role as direct care givers. This leads some women to 
accept lower individual wellbeing by remaining in the household than what they actually could 
achieve without their husband in order to care for and secure the future of their children. So, an 
improvement in women’s fall-back position will not necessarily support their wellbeing in the context 
of patriarchal child custody and patrilocal marriage. 
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis of gendered institutions, as asymmetric institutions, has important implications for the 
household bargaining approach in development economics. If we integrate our gendered institutional 
analysis into the bargaining approach, we find that gendered institutions affect the fall-back position, 
bargaining agency, what can be bargained over, as well as bargaining power. And for this last 
element, bargaining power, we have shown that women’s increased access to and control over 
resources, such as education and income, does not necessarily improve their bargaining power and 
wellbeing achievements. Sometimes, more economic strength is overruled by strong gendered 
institutions, so that men can take advantage of their wife’s economic position, while leaving her worse 
off. This is a windfall gain to men, without even having to bargain. Moreover, there is a third, almost 
invisible party, whose interests are at stake: children. Due to women’s important caring role in a 
traditional gender division of labour, they are more likely than men to include the interests of children 
in their own decision making. This implies that women’s bargaining goes beyond their self-interest. 
The theoretical implication of our gendered institutional analysis for development economics is that 
the household bargaining approach is not very well applicable in contexts of strong asymmetric 
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gendered institutions and also not very suitable to analyse household decisions when children’s 
wellbeing is involved, because this may reduce the extent to which women bargain for their own, 
individual interests. For such contexts, which are widespread in the developing world (and the 
developed world), household analysis should be broadened with gendered institutional analysis, 
focusing on formal and informal types of gendered institutions. 
An implication of our theoretical contribution and empirical findings is that policies to support 
women’s empowerment should not focus predominantly on strengthening women’s individual 
economic factors, but should include the wider institutional context of family law, property rights, and 
the non-material sources of masculine status. Moreover, it should recognize the caring interests of 
children and who of the bargaining partners takes these (most) into account and in which way. Only 
when such gendered institutions are addressed, women’s access to and control over resources will be 
able to contribute to their wellbeing achievements, and hence, to women’s empowerment. 
 
 
Notes 
1. Feminists working in the tradition of institutional economics would certainly agree that 
Veblen was concerned with women’s disadvantaged position. Dugger (1994, 3) even states that 
“Thorstein Veblen was a feminist of the first order”. Waller (1995) however cautions 
institutional economists not to employ Veblen’s insights uncritically, but to subject them to 
careful scrutiny for certain cultural biases of his time and place. 
2. The notion of “partner” refers to husband and wife. In the case of polygamy, each wife has 
her own household, of which the husband makes part, belonging to more than one household. 
3. Non-pooling refers to separate control over individual incomes and expenditure budgets for 
men and women in the household (no joint pot or accounts). 
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